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By using a choice experiment, this paper focuses on citizens’ preferences for effort-sharing 
rules of how carbon abatement should be shared among countries. We find that Swedes do not 
rank the rule favoring their own country highest. Instead, they prefer the rule where all 
countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per person, a rule that favors Africa at the 
expense of high emitters such as the U.S. The least preferred rule is reduction proportional to 
historical emissions. Using two different treatments, one where the respondents were 
informed about the country names and one where the country names were replaced with 
anonymous labels A-D, we also test whether people’s preferences for effort-sharing rules 
depend on the framing of the problem. We find that while the ranking of the principles is the 
same in both treatments, the strength of the preferences is significantly increased when the 
actual names of the countries are used. 
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1. Introduction 
Today, there is a consensus that any meaningful climate policy aimed to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHGs) must involve joint efforts among most countries in the world. 
However, the perception of how much each individual country should be obliged to reduce 
(often referred to as effort-sharing or burden-sharing rule) its GHGs differs among countries. 
During the last decade, a large literature has been devoted to identifying the most relevant 
effort-sharing rules in relation to international climate negotiations; see, e.g., Rose et al. 
(1998), Torvanger and Ringius (2002), Ringius et al. (2002), and Lange et al. (2007). While 
these articles have mainly focused on the economic consequences of the rules at the country 
level, one important aspect often neglected in the literature is ordinary citizens’ preferences 
for different effort-sharing rules. In line with Beetham (1991), one could argue that in order 
for policy makers to have legitimacy in international negotiations, the costs paid by each 
country to reduce emissions must be accepted and supported by its citizens, who in the end 
have to pay for the reduction. The present paper aims to fill this gap in the literature and 
therefore focuses on ordinary citizens’ preferences for different effort-sharing rules to give 
guidance about what people think is a fair allocation of the global mitigation of GHGs. 
 
The aim of effort-sharing rules is to assign emission limitations for countries in an equitable 
fashion. Once a rule, e.g., that countries must reduce emissions proportionally to historical 
emissions, is accepted, the same rule applies for all countries. However, research has shown 
that it is likely that preferences for a particular allocation rule are influenced by a fairness 
bias. For example, Johansson-Stenman and Konow (2009) denote the discrepancy between 
the fairness judgments made by a stakeholder and an impartial spectator as a fairness bias. 
This bias is due to both a self-centered bias, which is a discrepancy that the stakeholder is 
aware of, and a self-serving bias, which is a distortion of the stakeholders’ beliefs (see, e.g., 
Festinger, 1957; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Konow, 2000). Similar biases could be 
present if one asks about preferences for effort-sharing rules. For example, in the case of 
effort sharing, people from developing countries are more likely to prefer effort-sharing rules 
based on need, while people from developed countries are more likely to prefer a rule of equal 
sharing of the costs. The question is the extent to which these preferences are influenced by 
self-centered or self-serving principles. Given the potential of fairness bias to influence the 
possibility to reach settlements in climate negotiations
1, a second contribution of this paper is 
                                                 
1 Reaching a global agreement has proven very difficult, as illustrated by the COP 15 negotiations in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. 
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to test whether people have the same preferences for effort-sharing rules when the questions 
asked only address the rules per se as they do when the questions asked include information 
on actual country names. This is analogous to the way fairness bias is defined (Johansson-
Stenman and Konow, 2009). 
 
While we are unable to say anything about the motivation behind such a potential fairness 
bias, we are able to determine whether preferences are based only on the rules per se or if they 
are cofounded with personal preferences (positive or negative) for different countries. This is 
done by conducting two treatments of a survey-based choice experiment (CE) distributed to a 
random sample of Swedish citizens. In one treatment, we present how the different effort-
sharing rules relate to four groups of countries (US, EU, China, and Africa) in terms of how 
much they have to reduce their CO2 emissions. In the other treatment, we still give 
information describing the distributional consequences for the different countries/groups of 
countries, but their names are replaced with generic labels A to D. Thus, in the treatment 
without country names, respondents are not able to relate the consequences of the effort-
sharing rules to specific groups of named countries.
2 The aim of this comparison is to test for 
differences in willingness to pay for the different rules, and whether the ranking of the 
preferences differs between the treatments. A difference between the two treatments would 
imply that the rules per se do not fully capture people’s preferences, but that they depend on 
the countries being considered.  
 
Based on previous research (Torvanger and Ringius, 2002, and Lange et al., 2007), we use the 
following three effort-sharing rules to estimate distributional preferences: 1) CO2 reduction 
proportional to historical emission levels, 2) CO2 reduction proportional to current emission 
level, and 3) CO2 reduction based on equal right to emissions per person in all countries.
3  
 
                                                 
2 The treatment without country names can also be understood in terms of a blind test. Blind tests have 
previously been used in economics on a number of occasions. Mentioning a few, Golding and Rouse (2000) 
analyzed what difference blind auditions have made for female musicians in the U.S. and found evidence that 
blind auditions foster impartiality and increase the proportion of women in symphony orchestras. Lee et al. 
(2006) performed an experiment to elicit preferences for a beer containing balsamic vinegar. Not surprisingly, 
they found that preferences for the beer were higher in the blind-test treatment compared to when respondents 
were informed before or after tasting. McClure et al. (2004) found Coke to be rated higher when consumed from 
a cup bearing the brand logo rather from an unmarked cup.  
3 The decision to limit the choices to three effort-sharing rules was primarily made to reduce the cognitive load 
of the survey.
 Moreover, we limited our survey to CO2 emissions (and did not include all GHGs) again to make 
the survey congitively less demanding for the respondents.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the CE and the econometric 
model and Section 3 the results. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Survey and experiment design 
A random sample of Swedish citizens was surveyed using the CE method.
4 The respondents 
(repeatedly) chose their preferred alternative from a choice set. Survey responses were 
collected from a mail questionnaire sent out during the spring of 2009 to a random sample of 
1,200 men and women aged 18-75, drawn from the Swedish census registry. The country 
name treatment was applied to half the sample and the generic labels treatment to the other 
half. Hence, the only difference between the treatments was whether or not the country names 
(US, EU, China, and Africa) were presented. 
 
We did not send out any reminders, but the respondents got a lottery ticket (worth SEK 10) 
with the questionnaire to encourage them to fill in the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
consisted of questions about the respondents’ attitudes towards climate change, a choice 
experiment related to reductions in CO2 emissions (which we do not analyze in this paper), 
the choice experiment regarding effort-sharing rules analyzed in this study, and questions 
regarding the respondents’ socio-economic status. The alternatives in the choice sets were 
described by a number of attributes at different levels. The scenario description preceding the 




In each choice situation of the CE, the respondents had two alternatives to choose between. 
The alternatives differed with respect to principles for the effort-sharing rule and implied a 
cost to the respondent’s household. Each respondent answered four choice sets. As already 
mentioned, the effort-sharing rule attribute had three levels: reductions in CO2 according to (i) 
historical emission levels, (ii) current emission levels, and (iii) equal per capita emissions. 
Together with the effort-sharing rules, the respondents were also given information about 
each country’s/country group’s current emissions. The other attribute in the CE was yearly 
                                                 
4 For a methodological overview, see, e.g., Louviere et al. (2000) or Alpizar et al. (2003). 
5 Other studies have shown that the perception of distributive justice is also affected by efficiency concerns, i.e., 
whether an allocation of resources is made in an efficient way (Konow, 2001). In the present study, we are not 
primarily interested in such a trade off, and have therefore kept efficiency constant between the effort-sharing 
rules. Hence, there is no difference in total costs of reducing CO2 with 60% between the different effort-sharing 
rules. 
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cost to the respondent’s household until 2050. This attribute had four possible levels: 2,000, 
2,200, 2,400, and 3,000 SEK per year. The choice sets were created using a D-optimal linear 
design. The experimental design sufficiently reduced the correlation between the two 
attributes, allowing us to estimate the preferences separately. The attribute levels are 
summarized in Table 1.
6  
 
Table 1: Description of attributes 
Attribute Attribute  levels  Description 
Effort-sharing rules  According to historical 
emission levels 
Countries with a history of high emission levels per 
person must decrease their emissions more than 
countries with a history of lower emission. This option 
means, however, that countries with a history of high 
emissions will continue to emit more than others. 
  According to current 
emission levels 
Countries with currently high emission levels per 
person must decrease their emissions more than 
countries with currently low emission levels. This 
option means, however, that countries with currently 
high emissions will continue to emit more than others. 
  According to equal 
emission levels per person 
Countries with currently high emission levels per 
person must decrease their emissions much more than 
countries with low emission levels per person. 
Countries with very low emission levels might even be 
allowed to increase their emission levels. This option 
means that all countries are allowed to emit an equal 
amount per person. 
Cost    2000, 2200, 2400, 3000 
SEK 
Yearly cost for the household until year 2050. 
 
In order to illustrate more clearly to the respondent what the three effort-sharing rules would 
imply, we showed the current level of CO2 emissions per person and country and, for each of 
the rules, the corresponding decrease in emissions per person and country. The exact 
information provided to the respondents in the treatment with country names is given in 
Figure 1 below. In the treatment without country names, the country names were replaced 





                                                 
6 At the time of the survey, 1 USD = 7 SEK. 
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Figure 1. Presentation of emission reduction information in the survey; country name 
treatment, emissions expressed in metric ton. 
      Distribution of the reduction 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 019 
   
CO2 emissions per 
person today    According to historic 
emissions 
According to current 
emissions 
According to equal 
emissions/person in all 
countries 
USA    19 ton
    -13 ton  -11 ton  -17 ton 
EU    8.5 ton    -7 ton  -5 ton  -7 ton 
China    4.5 ton    - 1 ton  -3 ton  -2.5 ton 
Africa    1 ton    -0.5 ton  -0.5 ton  +1 ton 
 
As shown in Figure 1, moving from the effort-sharing rule current emission to either the 
historical or the equal emissions rules means that both the U.S. and the EU countries would 
have to decrease their emissions. African countries would either face about the same 
abatement requirement or even be allowed to increase their emissions, while China’s 
reduction would be the largest with the current emissions rule and the smallest with the 
historical emissions rule. Thus, those who, for example, want to “punish” the U.S. could 
choose the equal emissions rule, while those who want to minimize EU´s reduction obligation 
EU to have less reduction could pick the rule based on current emissions, irrespectively of 
what they think of the rules per se. Examples of the choice sets and the two treatments are 
given in Appendix 1. 
 
There are many possible interpretations of fairness and alternative value systems. Equal 
emissions per capita can be motivated as an extension of other human rights to public goods 
or common ecosystem resources. Reductions in proportion to current emissions means user 
rights in proportion to current emissions (also called grandfathering), and is related to the 
legal concept of “prior appropriation.” This principle underlies much of the current 
negotiations and even Kyoto had equal percentage reductions as its starting point (for Annex 
1 countries). Finally, abatement in proportion to historic emission levels reflects recognition 
of the fact that we are dealing with a stock and not a flow pollutant. Hence, those who have 
emitted a lot historically are asked to reduce their emissions somewhat more than others.  
 
Econometric Model 
In the analysis of the responses, we apply a standard random utility framework. However, in 
focus groups and in pilot studies, we learned that there was a risk that some respondents 
would not pay proper attention to the cost-for-the-household attribute. There is a growing 
literature indicating that this is the case for many stated preference surveys (see, e.g., Gilbride 
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et al., 2006; Carlsson et al., forthcoming; Campbell, 2008; Hensher, 2008; Scarpa et al., 
2009). Therefore, we chose to use a latent class model following Scarpa et al. (2009). This 
model allows for distinguishing respondents who do not pay attention to the cost attribute 
from those who do. In our case, the latent class model has two classes, one with no 
restrictions and one where the coefficient of the cost attribute is restricted to zero. The utility 
of alternative j for individual i in class t is specified as: 
t ij j t ijt x U ε β + =
' ,  
where  j x  is a vector of the attribute levels of alternative j,  t β  is the corresponding parameter 
vector for individuals in class t, and 
t ij ε  is an error term. Our main interest is to estimate the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for each of the effort-sharing rules. This will simply be the ratio 
between the attribute coefficient and the cost coefficient. For the class where the cost 
coefficient is restricted to zero, we will use the cost coefficient from the unrestricted class 
when estimating WTP. This means that we assume that all subjects have the same marginal 
utility of money, and thus the reason they ignored the cost attribute was not that they do not 
care about the money. One plausible explanation for why people ignore the cost attribute is 
that they might take more of a citizen perspective than an individual perspective when 
answering a stated preference survey. According to Nyborg (2000), this might be particularly 




In total 411 questionnaires were returned, of which 397 were sufficiently complete. Some 
respondents did not answer all six choice sets; however, we still chose to include these 
individuals in the analysis. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable  Description  Mean (Std. Dev.)  P-value  
t/proportion-test 
   With  names  Without  names   






























Lives in rural area  = 1 if respondent lives in a  0.35  0.33  0.74 
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rural area     
Lives in large city 
 








Using t-tests for the first two variables and proportion tests for the others, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of equal means/distributions for any of the socio-economic variables. Thus, the 
two samples in the two different treatments are definitely comparable.  
 
We now turn to the results of the latent class models. All models are estimated using Nlogit 
4.0. Note that the effort-sharing rule attribute is effects coded. This means that instead of 
normalizing the willingness to pay to zero for one of the attribute levels, we normalize the 
sum of willingness to pay to zero (see, e.g., Louviere et al., 2000). As discussed in the 
previous section, each model has two classes, where class 2 involves a restriction of the cost 
coefficient to be zero.  
 
Table 3. Estimated latent class logit models; standard errors in parentheses. 
  Without names  With names 
  Class 1  Class 2 
(non-attendance) 
Class 1  Class 2 
(non-attendance) 
Alternative specific constant (=1 
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McFadden pseudo R
2  0.11 0.16 
Always choose alternative with   
Least cost  8 %  6 % 
Historical emissions  6 %  5% 
Equal emissions  0 %  0 % 




 *** denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the class probabilities are around 0.5 for both models, indicating 
that in both treatments, there is a high probability that the respondents did not pay attention to 
the cost attribute when making their choices. In class 2, subjects are thus only making a 
choice between different effort-sharing rules, which means that we can still estimate the 
probability of choosing a certain rule. 
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The model based on the treatment with country names has a better fit, maybe because people 
find it easier to relate to the effort-sharing rules when helped by country names. This is further 
strengthened by the positive and significant intercept in the treatment without country names 
(for class 1). The positive intercept is a sign that respondents to some extent have had 
preferences for the left-hand alternative and since the CE is generic, this is likely to be driven 
by heuristics in their decision. Notably, this effect does not turn up in the treatment with 
names. Finally, at the bottom of Table 3, we see that the respondents generally do not show 
signs of having lexicographical preferences. For example, only 6-8 percent chooses the least 
cost alternatives in all the choice sets.  
 
The focus is to estimate the WTP for the different effort-sharing rules for the two treatments 
and then compare the WTP and ranking of rules between the treatments. The WTP results are 
presented in Table 4. Note that we report the average WTP for the two classes for each 
treatment. This means that we use the estimated cost coefficient for class 1 for all subjects 




Table 4. WTP and difference in WTP in SEK; standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  Average WTP (taking latent class probabilities into account)  Diff. average WTP 
 Without  names  With  names   
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 *** denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
There is consistency between the two treatments in terms of ranking of the rules. In both 
treatments, the equal emissions rule has the highest WTP. This principle favors Africa the 
most and puts the largest burden on the U.S. In both treatments, the second most favored rule 
is the current emissions rule. Note also that the current emissions rule is the most favorable 
for the EU. This preference ordering of the rules is in line with the results presented in 
Törnblom and Foa (1983), according to which Swedish subjects consistently seem to prefer 
equality (comparing equality, need and equity) for different so-called resources (love, status, 
information, money, goods, and services). The least preferred rule in both treatments is the 
historical emissions rule.  
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 019 10 
 
Even if the ranking is the same, there is a significant difference in WTP between the two 
treatments. The absolute values of the WTPs are larger in the treatment with country names. 
For example, the average WTP for an effort-sharing rule based on equal emissions per person 
is 506 SEK in the treatment with country names, but only 179 SEK in the other treatment. 
Using a t-test, two of the three WTPs are significantly different between the treatments. Thus, 
the main finding of the two-treatment test is that although people have consistent preferences 
for which rule they find to be the most fair, their WTP changes considerably when presented 
with the country names: The WTP for the rule equal emissions is significantly higher, while 
the WTP for current emissions is significantly lower. Hence, the strength of people’s 
preferences for fairness in allocation is dependent on whether the consequences of effort-
sharing rules are related to specific countries. One might conjecture that the feeling that “This 
is real and it’s important” becomes stronger when actual country names, rather than four 
letters, are used.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Fairness in effort sharing among countries has been a central point in the last few years of 
efforts to design a climate agreement. A number of different effort-sharing rules have been 
suggested in the hope that countries eventually will be able to agree upon some principle that 
they perceive as fair. Using responses from a choice-experiment on Swedish citizens, we test 
for three distributive preferences, i.e., for the effort sharing rules based on historical 
emissions, current emissions, and equal emissions. The equal emissions rule was found to be 
the rule that Swedes prefer the most, while the historical emissions rule attracted the least 
support. Naturally, the preferences for different effort-sharing rules may differ between 
countries, and important future research therefore includes studying individuals’ WTP in 
different countries. 
 
In addition to the issue of perceived fairness in allocation, we raise the question of whether 
people’s preferences for the rules are independent of how the rules affect specific countries or 
if people have fairness-bias in the sense that they do not make their decision based solely on 
the principles. Interestingly, the ranking of the three rules is the same for the two treatments, 
i.e., with and without names. However, the WTP for the equal emissions rule is significantly 
higher and less noisy while the WTP for current emissions is lower when country names are 
disclosed. This difference between the two treatments means that discussing effort-sharing 
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rules without referring to specific countries does not fully capture how people believe that the 
sharing should be undertaken.  
 
Our results also suggest that it is harder for the respondents to relate to the rules if not 
provided with information about their implications for specific countries/groups of countries. 
This showed up in terms of difference in explanatory power between the models, i.e., the 
treatment with names had higher explanatory power and lower variances and the treatment 
without names showed signs of heuristics in decision making. This result seems intuitive 
since the abstract principles are difficult to interpret and country names help the respondents 
by clearly showing how the rules would affect specific countries. On the other hand, one can 
argue that disclosing country names opens up for other considerations and aspects. With 
disclosure, it is no longer obvious that people´s choices only depend on how they perceive the 
fairness of the rules per se. It is likely that their choices are also affected by considerations 
related to the countries. 
 
While earlier findings have pointed to the risk that both self-centered and self-serving bias 
might complicate international agreements our research shows that respondents’ preferences 
may also include respect for fairness, particularly when explicit reference is made to country 
group names such as Africa. In our study, in the both treatments, individuals did not prefer the 
rule favoring their own country group (i.e., EU), but rather the rule that favored Africa. 
Hence, it seems, at least for the Swedish case, that this effect works in the opposite direction 
than both self-centered and self-serving bias. Interestingly, we found that this preference for 
fairness was not weakened but in fact strengthened when country names were disclosed. This 
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Figure A1: Example of choice set used in the questionnaire, treatment with names 
    Alternative 1    Alternative 2 






  According to historical 





  According to emission 





Yearly cost for your household   3,000  SEK   2,400  SEK 
 
I would choose:       □ Alternative 1    □ Alternative 2 
 
Figure A2: Example of choice set used in the questionnaire, treatment without names 
    Alternative 1    Alternative 2 






  According to historical 





  According to emission 





Yearly cost for your household   3,000  SEK   2,400  SEK 
 
I would choose:       □ Alternative 1    □ Alternative 2 
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